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THE BASIS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION
IN THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS*
FRANCIS R. ALEXIS"*
INTRODUCTION
Reflecting on judicial review of legislation, Professor William W. Van
Alstyne writes that
The controversies which have surrounded the exercise of this power
by the Supreme Court require a periodic reexamination of the con-
cept of judicial review at its source, the MARBURY decision.'
This article would like to adopt those words and adapt them to its
own context. But a qualification is advisable, and it is that the source of
judicial review lies, not really in any one decision, however momentous
it might be, but in the Constitutions themselves. With that caveat, one can
say that the cruciality of judicial review requires a periodic reexamination
of its basis. That basis, existing in the Constitutions, may also derive from
other sources. This article confines itself to a textual analysis of the Con-
stitutions, not because it fails to appreciate the value of the historical ap-
proach, but because, ultimately, it is what the framers put into the
Constitutions that matter most.
*Nine of the New Commonwealth independent countries have been selected, five
of which, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Barbados, Grenada and Trinidad and Tobago are
monarchies; the other four, Guyana, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and India are, like the
U.S.A., republics. Moreover, India, like the U.S.A., is a Federal State, and the others
unitary. This selection represents a broad cross-section of the New Commonwealth.
**B.A. (Hons.), University of the West Indies, 1971; LL.B. (Hons.), U.W.I.,
1973; LL.M. Candidate, U.W.I.; Assistant Lecturer in Law, U.W.I., Cave Hill Cam-
pus, Barbados.
For the production of this article, which is based on a chapter of my LL.M.
thesis now being written, I relied greatly on the inspiration and encouragement of my
supervisor, Prof. A. R. Carnegie, B.A. (Lond.-U.C.W.I.), M.A. (Oxon.), Dean of the
Faculty of Law, U.W.I., formerly Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford. I am also heavily
indebted to Mr. M. C. Okpaluba, LL.B., LL.M. (Lond.), LL.M. (Tor.), a fellow Lec.
turer in the Faculty of Law, U.W.I.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
Judicial review of legislation assumes the existence of supreme or
fundamental law constituting a yardstick by which other laws are measured
for their validity. The Constitutions of the New Commonwealth 2 and the
United States of America are of this nature. This article posits that the
Supreme Courts 3 of these countries do have the power, the duty, to
pronounce laws enacted by these Legislatures to be inconsistent with or
repugnant to the various Constitutions, and so, void, subject to provisions
in the Constitution to the contrary.
THE SUPREME LAW CLAUSE
Most of these Constitutions themselves, by express command, render
void such laws as are inconsistent with the Constitutions. Having de-
clared themselves to be "the supreme law" of the land, they then lay
down that
if any other law is inconsistent with the Constitutions, this Constitu-
tion shall prevail, and the other law shall, to the extent of the incon-
sistency, be void;
or that, as in the U.S.A.,
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.4
Where no such express provision appears, as in Trinidad and Tobago,
Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka, it is well to bear in mind S.A. de Smith's
view that the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution "does not
strictly need to be expressly stated."'5 For as the Supreme Court of the
United States, through MARSHALL, C.J., put it in MARBURY v.
MADISON, 6 "essentially attached" to written constitutions being funda-
mental law, is the principle that laws inconsistent therewith are void,
that is what the theory of every such government "must be,' '7 subject to
express provisions in the Constitution to the contrary.
It is true that the supreme law clause of the New Commonwealth
Constitutions does not expressly speak to Judges in the way that the one
in the American Constitution does, but these Constitutions explicitly set out
the principle on which MARBURY v. MADISON was rested,8 which
principle does not so appear in the American Constitution.
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE NEW COMMONWEALTH
A not insignificant circumstance of these Constitutions being supreme
law is that these legislatures cannot be said to be sovereign in the way
that term is used in the classical Diceyan teaching on the doctrine of
United Kingdom parliamentary sovereignty,9 in whatever other sense they
might be sovereign, 10 for an essential trait of such a legislature is that
there is "no marked or clear distinction between laws which are not
fundamental or constitutional and laws which are fundamental or constitu-
tional. 1 This means that the case against judicial review of legislation
based on the existence of such a legislature 12 has no place in the juris-
prudence of these countries.
CONSTITUTIONS 'CONTROL LEGISLATURES
ORDINARY LAWS
Where a Constitution is a body of supreme law whence state agencies
derive their authority, the power of the legislature, being a state agency,"
must be "subject to the provisions of the Constitution." This principle,
too, essentially inheres in a written Constitution. Some Constitutions may
state it expressly, as most of those under review do, others may not;1
4
it is all the same.1 5 And, as WOODING, C.J., said in the Trinidadian
case COLLYMORE v. A.G. (TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO), 6 the section
saying so "means what it says. And what it says, and says very clearly, is
that the power and authority of Parliament to make laws are subject to its
[the Constitution's] provisions."'
7
In other words, even in making ordinary laws, as LORD PEARCE,
speaking for the Privy Council in BRIBERY 'COMR. v. RANASINGHES
put it, "a legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law-making
that are imposed by the instrument which itself regulates its power to
make law."' 9
And many are these conditions of law-making, these restrictions on
the power of these legislatures, which underline the subordination of these
legislatures to the Constitutions20 and at the same time strongly suggest
the existence of judicial review.
ALTERATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONS
Laws altering the Constitutions are not ordinary laws. However, the
requirements for constitutional alteration do represent serious restrictions
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
on the power of these legislatures. Undoubtedly all these legislatures may
alter any and all of the provisions of the Constitutions, 21 but apart from
a few provisions in the Bahamas and the Trinidad and Tobago Constitu-
tions, all the provisions of these Constitutions are entrenched, at varying
levels, some alterations requiring in some countries majority votes of the
electors in referenda, in others ratification by states' legislatures, and in
one of them a dissolution of Parliament between successive sessions of
Parliament.
22
This means that these legislatures are unable to meet yet another of
the three traits of Dicey's sovereign legislature, which is that "fundamental
or so-called constitutional laws are . . . changed by the same body and in
the same manner as other laws, namely, by Parliament acting in its
ordinary legislative character."
2 3
Now this is crucial, "the traditional answer denying judicial review
was to a large extent dependent on the traditional view of the sovereignty
of Parliament. If that view be not accepted, views on judicial review are
affected. '24 Certainly, the third trait of Dicey's sovereign legislature, that
there cannot be "any person or body of persons, executive, legislative or
judicial, which can pronounce void any enactment passed by . . . Parli-
ament on the ground of such enactment being opposed to the constitution,
or on any ground whatever, '25 seems to depend on the presence of the
other two traits. For if there is no limit to the power of a legislature, and
there is no yardstick against which the validity of its laws may be
measured, judicial review must be out of context.
BILLS OF RIGHTS
No doubt the weightiest set of restrictions on the power of these
legislatures in making ordinary laws is to be found in the Bills of Rights
entrenched into these Constitutions, all guaranteeing persons the right to
life, liberty, security of the person, enjoyment of property, protection of
the law, freedom of conscience, expression, assembly and association,
respect for private and family life, and freedom from unfair discrimina-
tion.26
Legislature Expressly Spoken To
That some of the Bills of Rights provisions are express orders to the
legislatures to do or not to do certain things in the interest of the individual
is not open to doubt. Thus, the case of a person charged with a criminal
offence, is to he heard by "an independent and impartial court established
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by law."'27 Similarly, any court or other adjudicating authority which
determines the existence or extent of any civil right or obligation "shall be
established by law and shall be independent and impartial. '28 Of course,
the right to have one's case determined by an "independent and impartial"
tribunal inheres in "equal protection of the laws"' 29 as it does in "due
process of law." 30 Still controlling positively the contents of laws, the Con-
stitutions lay down that if private property is to be compulsorily acquired,
the legislatures must make laws providing for prompt and adequate, or
just compensation, or prescribing the principles on which and the manner
in which compensation is to be determined, and, in most countries, giving
any person having an interest in or a right over the property a right of
access to the Supreme Court for determining the amount of compensation
to which he is entitled.
31
Then the Constitutions control negatively the contents of legislation.
They lay down that "no law shall make any provision which is discrimina-
tory either of itself or in its effect," 32 for all are entitled to the "equal
protection of the law." 3 3 So too, the U.S. Congress is to make "no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. ' 34 Likewise,
having set out rights and freedoms in section one, the Trinidad and
Tobago Constitution, then ordains in section two that
no law shall abrogate, abridge or infringe or authorise the abrogation,
abridgment or infringement of any of the rights and freedoms here-
inbefore recognised and declared and in particular no Act of Parlia-
ment shall
do many things, including the imposition of cruel and unusual treatment
or punishment, and the depriving a person of the right to a fair hearing
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the deter.
mination of his rights and obligations.
35
In fact, those provisions in section two constitute one of the two sets
of provisions on which the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal based
judicial review in COLLYMORE v. A.G., (TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO).
There, the Industrial Stabilisation Act, 1965,36 was alleged, unsuccessfully,
to have contravened the Constitution. 37 To the extent that the validity of
the Act was vindicated, what was said about judicial review was strictly
obiter. 35 Nevertheless, the Court unanimously dealt with the matter, maybe
because it felt that the opportunity for asserting the doctrine was too
propitious to be lost.
39
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Wooding, C.J., took the view that section two of the Trinidad and
Tobago Constitution is, not a rule of construction, as be understood section
two of the Canadian Bill of Rights to be,40 but an act of limitation; and,
on that foundation, said:
I am accordingly in no doubt that our Supreme Court has been con-
stituted, and is, the guardian of the Constitution, so it is not only
within its competence but also its right and duty to make binding
declarations, if and whenever warranted, that an enactment passed by
Parliament is ultra vires and therefore void and of no effect
'because it abrogates, abridges or infringes or authorises the abroga-
tion, abridgement or infringement of one 'or more of the rights and
freedoms recognised and declared by S.I. of the chapter. I so, hold.
41
Whatever doubts PHILLIPS, J.A., bad of the true interpretation of
the Canadian provisions, 42 it seemed to him that the imperative provisions
of S.2. of the Trinidadian Constitution exclude their being understood
otherwise than as invalidating any law which offends against the pro-
hibitions. Continuing, the learned Justice of Appeal said:
When once this proposition is accepted, it appears to me to be
obvious that even without express provision a power of judicial re-
view of Parliamentary legislation must reside in the Supreme Court
of this country.43
FRASER, J.A., also looked to S.2. for a conferment of the power of
judicial review on the Court.4
Legislature Impliedly Spoken To
Then other provisions of the Bills of Rights simply define infringe-
ment without excluding infringement by the legislatures. Such is the
stipulation that no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life save in
pursuance of a court sentence in respect of a criminal offence of which he
has been convicted. 45 This means that Parliament cannot violate the pro-
vision 'by legislating, for example, that persons may be deprived of their
lives for criminal offences of which they have been accused even if they
have not been convicted, or by legislating that persons may be deprived of
their lives for civil offences.
That reasoning is applicable to many other Bills of Rights provisions.
Take, for example, those laying down that no person shall be subjected to
torture, or inhuman, or degrading, or cruel and unusual punishment or
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other treatment; 46 that no person shall be subjected to the search of his
person or his property or the entry by others on his premises; 47 and that
no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience,
expression, or peaceful assembly and association.
48
Natural Justice Now Governs The Legislatures
Whether a decision has been reached in disregard of the rules of
Natural Justice - the common law doctrine that where a judicial or
quasi-judicial administrative, as distinct from legislative, decision prej-
udicially affects the liberty or property of a person, he has a right to
be heard fairly before such decision is reached, and by an unbiased and
impartial tribunal - is undoubtedly a matter over which the courts have
jurisdiction. 9 If, then, those rules are extended to cover legislative action,
surely, barring express provision to the contrary, the courts would have
jurisdiction in this regard also. This is exactly the situation in these
countries.
Short of amending the Constitutions, these legislatures cannot deny
the individual the right to be afforded, in criminal trials, "a fair hearing
within a reasonable time" by an "independent and impartial court",50
the right to be given early notification of the nature of the alleged offence,
adequate time and facilities for preparing his defence, and the right to be
afforded facilities for calling one's own witnesses and examining those
called by the prosecution. 51 So, too, these legislatures are not to deny
persons the right to have matters touching their civil rights or obligations
decided by an "independent and impartial" court or other adjudicating
tribunal and be given "a fair hearing within a reasonable time."52
Enveloping these rules is the concept which has been described by
FRANKFURTER, J., in the American case ADAMSON v. CALIFORNIA 53
as embracing "those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those charged
with the most heinous offences. ' ' 54 He was speaking of the concept of
"due process of law," 55 however unfixed that concept may be. 56
In these countries, then, these rules do not constitute a mere con-
stitutional convention, as they do in the United Kingdom and South
Africa.57 Rather they represent laws of the Constitution binding the
legislatures fully. And just as the Courts guard the rules in relation to
administrative action at common law so too they guard them in relation
to legislative action under the Constitutions in the absence of express pro-
vision to the contrary.
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Enforcement of Bills of Rights
So, coupling the general supremacy of these Constitutions with the
specifics of the Bills of Rights, it is not easy to resist the conviction of
PHILLIPS, J.A., quoted above, that it is obvious that even without ex-
press provision a power of judicial review exists,58 in the absence, one
might add, of a clear directive from the Constitutions to the contrary.
The framers of the Republican Sri Lanka Constitution appreciated
the force of this submission. They did not want it to apply to their Con-
stitution for one reason or another 59 so they expressly stipulated that
No institution administering justice and likewise no other institu-
tion, person or authority shall have the power or jurisdiction to
inquire into, pronounce upon or in any manner call in question the
validity of any law of the National State Assembly."
They created a 'Constitutional Court and set out to give it exclusive power
to pass on whether a Bill, not an Act, is inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion, 61 and provided further that the decision of the Constitutional Court
"shall be conclusive for all purposes" and that no institution administering
justice shall inquire into, pronounce upon or in any manner call in
question a decision of the Constitutional Court.
62
Far from a similar provision appearing in the other Constitutions to
rebut the presumption of reviewability raised by the circumstances con-
sidered above, in all except the American Constitution, is an unambiguous
directive to the Supreme Court to entertain, hear, and determine any
application by any person that any of the Bill of Rights provisions has
been contravened, actually or threatened, in relation to him, thus buttressing
formidably the case for judicial review. With slight variations in wording,
they all ordain that
(1) If any person alleges that any of [the provisions of the Bill
of Rights] of this Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be con-
travened in relation to him, then, without prejudice to any other
action with respect to the same matter which is lawfully available,
that person may apply to the Supreme Court for redress.
Then comes the straightforward and unequivocal directive to the Supreme
Court:
(2) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction
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(a) to hear and determine any application made by any
person in pursuance of paragraph/subsection (1) of
this Article/Section;
(b) .. .
and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions
as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or
securing the enforcement of any of the provisions of [the Bill of
Rights] to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled.
63
No wonder then that, in relation thereto, PHILLIPS, J. A., of
Trinidad and Tobago having stated that the power of judicial review,
given the various limitations imposed by these Constitutions on these
legislatures, does not need to be expressly stated, added this:
Actually, however, the position is put beyond doubt by the express
terms of [the enforcement provision just quoted]
64
Notably, from such determinations guaranteed appeals lie "as of
right" sometimes to the highest court of the legal system,65 other times
not to the highest but certainly to a court higher than the Supreme
Court.66
The corresponding Indian provision is that
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate pro-
ceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part
is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or
orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition quo warranto, and certiorari, whichever may
be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by this Part.
67
In the Indian case STATE OF MADRAS v. V. G. ROW, 68 SHASTRI,
C. J., said that the Constitution of India "makes express provision for
judicial review of legislation."6 9 The learned Chief Justice did not identify
the provisions on which he was resting. If he was thinking of those just
quoted, one should say that the better view is that of PHILLIPS, J. A.,
of Trinidad and Tobago, that these provisions put the matter "beyond
doubt," which is not the same thing as saying that they make "express
provision for judicial review."
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They put the matter "beyond doubt" because they do not exclude
any particular kind of contravention of the Bill of Rights from occasioning
an application by a person and a hearing and determination by the
Supreme Court. And it is a commonplace of constitutional law that, as
BOSE, J., of the Supreme Court of India put it in DWARKADAS
SHRINIVAS OF BOMBAY v. THE SHOLARPUR SPINNING AND
WEAVING CO. LTD.,
70
[T]he provisions in the Constitution touching fundamental rights
must be construed broadly and liberally in favour of those on whom
the rights have been conferred
71
A generous and liberal construction being appropriate to these Bills of
Rights, it is all the same whether they are infringed by legislative action
or by any other kind of action.
72
Nothing in the Constitutions, in logic, or in reason, warrants reading
into the sections a clause excepting infringement of the rights by Acts of
the legislatures from the generality thereof. On the contrary, the im-
peratives of a written constitution demand that the provisions be inter-
preted in the full plenitude of their meaning, which entails that legislative
violations fall within the mischiefs they seek to cure.
71
So one is not surprised to find that the Courts see in these provisions
a commission to them to review parliamentary legislation and to declare
it inconsistent with the Constitution in a proper case. This was the second
set of provisions on which the Trinidad and Tobago Court of Appeal
relied in the COLLYMORE case for asserting its power of judicial
review.74 WOODING, 'C.J., said that under the facility of these pro-
visions the appellants "are in my opinion entitled to the right to pro-
ceed,"75 while, as seen above, PHILLIPS, J. A., saw these provisions as
putting the actuality of judicial review "beyond doubt. ' 76 Urged by the
learned Attorney General to hold that the doctrine of ultra vires was not
applicable to the instant case FRASER, J. A., replied:
Having regard to the provisions [being discussed] it is difficult
to understand this submission. By that section any person may apply
to the High Court for relief against the operation of any law which
may offend against the provisions of S.2 of the Constitution. There
is no doubt in my mind about this.
Continued the learned Justice of Appeal,
and the conjoint effect of ss.2 and 677 of the Constitution is to confer
upon the High Court the function of judicial review over such
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE NEW COMMONWEALTH
legislative measures as may be taken in contravention of the expressed
provisions of [the Bill of Rights]
78
As in the COLLYMORE case, so too in the Guyanese case JAUNDOO
v. A. G. (GUYANA) 79 what was said on judicial review of legislation
was strictly obiter,80 but once again, the question of the violation of the
Bill of Rights having arisen, the opportunity was too golden to let slip."
STOBY, C., assumed the existence of judicial review.8 2 LUCKHOO, J.A.,
said that a failure to comply with the Bill of Rights "be it on the part
of Government or otherwise" creates a legal right to apply for a legal
remedy to protect, safeguard and enforce the wronged provisions, and
that "[w]ithin the confines of art, 19s3 lies the responsibility for this
most exacting task." 84 It was based on this article, 19, that he declared:
[T]he court is the custodian and guardian of the Constitution,
seeking as it must at all times to prevent encroachment on or
violation of the rights, to the depths of its power, be it against
Government or legislature.8 5
In short, "the Constitution recognises contraventions, however arising,
' '8 6
said the learned Justice of Appeal.
It was based on art. 19 that CUMMINGS, J. A., having observed
that prior to the commencement of the Constitution the avoidance of
inroads into rights declared by the Constitution as fundamental rights
against legislative invasion was an extra-judicial matter, went on to
say that with the commissioning of the Constitutions:
[R]emedies in the nature of the prerogative writs for the curb of
executive violation were now to appear with regard to legislative
violation by virtue of the court's new jurisdiction to make 'such
orders', give 'such directions' as it 'may consider appropriate for
the purpose of the enforcement of any of the provisions' relating to
fundamental rights.
8 7
The learned Justice of Appeal added that the provision contemplates the
immediate alerting of the Court to a threatened or actual violation of a
fundamental right and the Court's immediate reaction as being "Now,
whoever or whatever you are, show cause why!" 88 He ended his judg.
ment and the case on a very appropriate note, in this way:
No doubt art. 19 of the Constitution casts upon the court a
heavy responsibility and a difficult task, but this does not justify
judicial abdication. 'Fear must not lend wings to our feet.'8 9
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Just as the Trinidad and Tobago, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka
Constitutions, the Associated States9" Constitutions91 do not have a supreme
law clause, but they state the power of the legislatures in the same way
that most of the independent states do; 92 they too have all their provisions
entrenched ;93 they also contain Bills of Rights, 94 buttressed by enforcement
provisions in virtually the identical phraseology of the independence
Constitutions.95 The consequence is that although, as Urias Forbes ob-
served, the Associated States Constitutions "do not anywhere explicity
give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review substantive legislation and
to pronounce upon the vires of such legislation," yet, as he rejoined,
"this jurisdiction is not explicitly withheld from the Court." 96 Rather,
the relevant provisions are wide enough to recognise contraventions, as
LUCKHOO, J. A., put it in the JAUNDOO case, "however rising."
9 7
Admittedly, the enforcement provisions do not specifically refer to
Acts of Parliament. But for that matter they do not single out any
given kind of contravention. Surely, however, it could not be asserted on
that ground that no kind of contravention is included. The better view
is that they frown upon all contraventions "however arising," the view
which the Supreme Court of the Associated States9" takes of the matter.99
Why Shield Legislation?
The express shielding by the framers of the contents of some kinds
of legislation from being held inconsistent with the Constitutions, surely,
makes sense only if the above analysis is accurate. The provision that no
person shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading or cruel
and unusual punishment or treatment has as its proviso that
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law
shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this
article/section to the extent that the law in question authorises the
infliction of any description of punishment that was lawful ...
immediately 'before [Independence Day] 100 (emphasis added).
The language of that, and other provisos of its kind, 0 is interesting
in that its reference to nothing in a law being "held" inconsistent with
the Constitution very much suggests the decision of some tribunal. If
no other tribunal is named in the Constitutions, as is the case in all of
them, Sri Lanka apart, it must be a court decision which has been
contemplated. Another thing is that these provisos patently seek to
immunise from being held inconsistent with the Constitutions the sub-
stance of legislation itself, speaking as they do of things "contained in . . .
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any law" and the law in question," which is to be distinguished from
references therein to things "done under" the law.
The more commonplace kind of exception clause lays down that
"nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law" shall be
"held" inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution to the
extent that "the law in question" is reasonably required in the interest
of defence, public safety, public morality public health; or for the
purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of other persons; or for
preventing or detecting crime. This is the proviso which qualifies provi-
sions protecting persons against forced searches of person or property
or forced entry on premises; 102 provisions protecting freedom of con-
science, expression, assembly and association, and movement; 10 3 provisions
ensuring freedom from discrimination on the grounds of race, colour,
creed, political opinions, and place of origin;104 and provisions ensuring
freedom from deprivation of propery.10 5
These exceptions all lead inexorably to the conclusion, as a matter
of law and logic, that anything contained in any "law," which term
includes "any instrument having the force of law" as defined by the
Constitutions themselves,10 6 which exceeds the limits allowed by the
provisos shall be "held" inconsistent with the Constitutions by the Supreme
Court.
In Trinidad and Tobago, there are three general exception clauses,
one relating to laws adapting or modifying existing laws; another to
Acts passed during a period of public emergency except insofar as their
provisions are shown not to be reasonably justifiable for dealing with the
emergency; and thirdly, Special Acts passed by not less than three-fifths
of all the members of each House of Parliament except insofar as their
provisions are shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a society that has
a proper respect for the rights and freedoms of the individua °10 7 In
relation to the latter two exceptions, the Constitution Commission of that
Country 0 5 had this to say:
It would be for the Courts to decide whether the provisions of
any such law passed in a period of public emergency are not
reasonably justifiable for dealing with the existing situation. Like-
wise, it would be for the Courts to decide whether the provisions of
any law passed at any time by the required majority are not reason-
ably justifiable in a society with a proper respect for the rights and
freedoms of the individual.10 9
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NON-BILL OF RIGHTS PROVISIONS.
It will have been observed that in considering the case for judicial
review of legislation covering the Bills of Rights, no one set of provisions
was looked at as the touchstone to judicial review, not even the enforce-
ment provisions, although these admittedly go a long way towards cement-
ing the case for judicial review. But they are not indispensable to the
case. After all, there are no such provisions in the U. S. Constitution.
Focus was put on the totality of the provisions, some of which are not
unique to the Bills of Rights.
Thus, the supremacy of these Constitutions,110  of considerable
weight, is of general application. So too is the controlled nature of the
power of these legislatures when acting ordinarily, 111 and when altering
the Constitutions.'
1 2
And just as in the Bills of Rights, so too in the other articles/sections
there are provisions which evidence the subordination of these legislatures
to the constitutions and at the same time strongly support the case for
judicial review.
Citizenship
Arguably, a person's right not to be deprived of his citizenship is no
less fundamental than his right not to be deprived of his property without
compensation.' 13 Accordingly, most of these Constitutions forbid the
legislatures to deprive of citizenship those who are citizens by virtue of
birth or parentage." 4
Grenadian Laws To Be Published
A provision in the Grenada Constitution is that no law made by
Parliament shall come into operation until it has been published in the
Gazette. 15 If it is true that at common law even subordinate legislation
is operative antecedent to publication 116 the Grenadian provision is re-
markable.
Lifetime of Parliament
In most of these countries, Parliament's normal life span is five
years, in Sri Lanka six years, in the U.S.A. two years for members of
the House of Representatives and six years for Senators, and in India
five years for members of the House of the People and two years for
Councillors. 1 7 Admittedly, an Act of the United Kingdom's Parliament,
"he Parliament Act, 191111 says so for the United Kingdom too. 119 But
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unlike that ordinary Act, these provisions are entrenched in the Con-
stitutions. 120 True, where any of these countries is at war, Parliament
may extend its normal life-span, but not for more than twelve months
at a time, and not for more than a total of two years in the Bahamas,
Jamaica, and Barbados, and five years in the others, not including the
U.S.A., Sri Lanka and India which do not have this provision.121
Electoral Law
In Jamaica and Barbados, any law providing for the election of
members of Parliament is required to contain provisions designed to
ensure that electors have a reasonable opportunity of voting, provisions
on the conduct of the elections, and, in the case of Barbados, provisions
for the division of Barbados into constituencies.' 22 In the U.S.A. the
right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race, colour
or previous condition of servitude, or sex, nor, in India, on grounds only
of religion, race, caste, or sex. 123 And in Guyana, election to Parliament
shall be by secret ballot in accordance with proportional representa-
tion.t 24 In the Bahamas, Parliament is enabled to provide for the institu-
tion of proceedings for determining questions as to membership of the
House of Assembly; and to regulate the powers, practice and procedure
of an Election Court established by the Constitution, but Parliament is
expressly subject to the articles providing for tenure of office of members
of the House of Assembly and determining questions as to membership
thereof.
125
Habeas Corpus, Bills of Attainder, Ex Post Facto Laws
Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts may be passed at any time in the
U.K. through the ordinary legislative procedure. 126 Not so in the U.S.A.,
for there, the privilege of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
rebellion, invasion or public safetey requires it. So too no bill of Attainder
or ex post facto law shall be passed.
127
Bills To Be Passed In Accordance With The Constitutions
A. R. Carnegie observes that the Constitutions of Guyana and
Trinidad and Tobago [Sierra Leone too] provide that no Bill shall be-
come law unless passed in accordance with the Constitution, 128 which
is true.129 But that provision represents, not really a separate mani-
festation of the supremacy of the Constitution over Parliament, but rather,
merely the sum total of such prohibitions, limitations, and restrictions as
considered above.
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Those Limitations Suggest Judicial Review
Given these prohibitions, limitations, and restrictions on the power
of the Legislatures, it is not possible to associate them with the classical
doctrine of U.K. parliamentary sovereignty, so the case against judicial
review of the acts of that kind of legislature, as seen already.
130
Such other ground appears in the Sri Lanka Constitution. This has
already been noticed.
131
But far from such other base appearing in the other Constitutions
the Constitution of Grenada actually provides that:
(1) . . . any person who alleges that any provision of this Con-
stitution (other than a provision of Chapter 1)132 has been or is being
contravened may, if he has a relevant interest, apply to the High Court
for a declaration and for relief under this section.
(2) The High Court shall have jurisdiction in an application
made under this section to determine whether any provision of this
Constitution (other than a provision of Chapter 1) has been or is
being contravened and to make a declaration accordingly.
(3) Where the High Court makes a declaration under this
section that a provision of this Constitution has been or is being
contravened and the person on whose application the declaration
is made has also applied for relief, the High Court may grant to
that person such remedy as it considers appropriate, being a remedy
available generally under the law of Grenada in proceedings in the
High Court.
13
If the decision is a final one in any civil or criminal proceedings as
to the interpretation of this Constitution, appeals from the High Court to
the Court of Appeal and thence to the Privy Council lie "as of right."
134
All these provisions appear in the Associated States Constitutions. 135
Here again, as in the case of the enforcement provision in respect to
the Bills of Rights, nothing in these provisions suggests that they do not
encompass legislative contravention. Nor should such an exception be read
thereinto, for the reason that, as MARSHALL, C.J., put it in M'CULLOCH
v. MARYLAND 136 "[W]e must never forget that it is a Constitution we
are expounding,"' 137 the philosophy of which is that provisions in a Con-
stitution are to be construed liberally and munificently in favour of those
on whom the right has been bestowed. 3
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The U.S. Constitution, quite apart from its supreme law clause which
is expressly addressed to the Judges,13 9 lays down that
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority. 140
Yet Edward S. Corwin asks why did not the framers of the American
Constitution, if they wanted judicial review, choose "explicit and unmis-
takeable" language.' 4 ' But as Raoul Berger suggests, citing the provision
just quoted, "the meaning of the language chosen was plain enough."'
142
Some views seek to confine the unqualified words of those provisions
to acts of State not including acts of Congress;1 43 others would relate
them to acts of the legislature but confining them within arbitrarily
chosen circumscribed areas, for example, the matter of judicial "self-
defence; '144 yet others considering the clause ambiguous or inadequate.
145
This article is not prepared to read into those provisions such limita-
tions in such an unwarrantable fashion. Only the very clearest directives
of the framers would justify a construction which is not benevolent to the
persons on whom rights' 46 have been conferred. So the better view is that
these provisions are "broad enough to comprehend power to set aside
Congressional Acts which are inconsistent with the Constitution.'
47
The other Constitutions do not have such provisions in relation to the
non-Bill of Rights sections. But the way one should approach the issue is
this. The functions of the regular courts of law include investigating
whether a rule proposed for application really has the nature of law. For
example, what may be presented as delegated legislation may not be law
at all through its being ultra vires the parent Act. Where a Constitution
is supreme law with the consequences that law inconsistent therewith is
void, as is the case with these Constitutions, 48 the Constitution is like the
parent Act, with other laws being valid only insofar as they are consistent
with the Constitution. If the legal order does not contain any explicit rule
to the contrary, there is a presumption that all the regular courts have
the duty to investigate whether a rule, not being a rule of the Constitution,
proposed for application, has the nature of law. Mauro Cappelletti and
John Clarke Adams put it this way:
When there is a written constitution that cannot be amended by
ordinary legislation, there is created a hierarchy of law, and just as a
law prevails over an administrative regulation, so a constitutional
provision prevails over an ordinary law: lex superior derogat legi
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injeriori. According to this reasoning, when the courts declare a law
incompatible with a provision in the constitution, they are merely
performing their normal and fundamental judicial function of 'apply-
ing the law.'
149
Only a restriction of this power is needed. 150 The Sri Lanka Con-
stitution has set out to provide such a restriction in relation to all the
regular courts of law, having commissioned a Constitutional Court to deal
exclusively with such questions and only as far as Bills are concerned.
151
The other Commonwealth countries, Jamaica excepted, have also imposed
restrictions in relation to the enforcement of the Bills of Rights, and, in
Grenada, in addition thereto, in relation to the other provisions of the
Constitution. The Constitutions provide that
If, in any proceedings in any court subordinate to/other than the
Supreme Court any question arises as to the contravention of any of
the [Bill of Rights provisions] the court in which the question has
arisen shall refer the question to the Supreme Court.
And the Supreme Court is given original jurisdiction to determine such
references.' 
52
This provision, which appears in the Associated States in relation to
both Bill of Rights and non-Bill of Rights provisions,153 could have been
taken to the conclusion to which it was in Sri Lanka. It was not done
because it was not desired by the framers. Nor must this or any other
generation read into the Constitutions a provision which has the effect of
putting there what the framers refused to write in, for better or for worse.
Clearly, there is nothing particularly sophisticated about the proposi-
tion that since no clause expressly confers the power of judicial review no
such power exists. That kind of argument, understandably, was unable to
impress the Appellate Division of the South Africa Supreme Court in
HARRIS v. DONGES. 54 Understandably, it is suggested, because one has
to have regard to the sum total effect of the provisions of a Constitution
before one can say yea or nay to judicial review. If the total effect thereof
is that the Constitution is supreme over the legislature with the consequent
voidness of law inconsistent with the Constitution, then, barring express
provision to the contrary, judicial review suggests itself. As the Federalist
No. 781 55 put it, if a Constitution has superior obligation and validity, it
must be preferred to a statute.
1 56
That is the philosophy behind MARBURY v. MADISON. There, an
Act of Congress, the Judiciary Act, 1789, purported to authorise the
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Supreme Court to issue mandamus in its original jurisdiction 157 when the
Constitution confers only appellate jurisdiction in that matter. 158 Starting
from the premise that an act of the legislature repugnant to the supreme
law of a Constitution is void, MARSHALL, C.J., said that where the law
and the Constitution conflict with each other,
If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitu-
tion is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution,
and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both
apply.1
59
Felix Frankfurter considers this reasoning to be "not impeccable and
its conclusion, however wise, not inevitable."' 160 If the reasoning is not
impeccable it is not unsound anyway. And if its conclusion, admittedly
wise, is not inevitable in respect of a written constitution simpliciter, it
certainly is so in the context of a written Constitution having about it all
the marks of supremacy treated above without there being some such
rebutting provision as appears in the Sri Lanka Constitution.
Certainly, the Privy Council takes it for granted that from the
premise it stated in BRIBERY COMMISSIONER v. RA-NASINGHE, that
"a legislature has no power to ignore the conditions of law-making that
are imposed by the instrument which itself regulates its power to make
law," 161 must follow, no doubt subject to express provisions to the con-
trary, judicial review. For neither in that case itself where the Bribery
Amendment Act, 1958, nor in LIYANAGE v. THE QUEEN 162 where the
Criminal Law (Special Provisions) Act, 1962 and the Criminal Law Act,
1962, all of Ceylon, 163 as it was then known, nor in AKAR v. A.G.
(SIERRA LEONE)' 64 where the Constitution (AMENDMENT) (NO. 2)
Act, 1962, of Sierra Leone 65 were all struck down by the Privy Council
for being inconsistent with the respective Constitutions, 166 did the Privy
Council essay the kind of philosophy of its assumption of judicial review
as is found in MARBURY v. MADISON.
Why Expressly Exclude lurisdiction in Certain Cases?
If the framers did not intend to entrust general guardianship of these
Constitutions to the Supreme Court, why was it necessary for them to have
set out to expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court from certain matters?
More than one state agency has been expressly shielded from the protec-
tive arm of the courts. These include the titular Heads of States,
1 67 and
their Deputies, 68 the various Services Commissions, 169 and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives where he certifies certain Acts.
170
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Admittedly, these examples all relate to the administrative, not legis-
lative, branches. But their usefulness is this: the attempt to debar the
courts from having jurisdiction over those agencies suggests that the
framers appreciated that the Courts have jurisdiction over all state agencies
subject only to an express provision to the contrary. They did not want
the named agencies to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts, so
they said so. Other agencies, not so protected, for example, the legisla-
tures, therefore remain answerable to the Courts. Indeed, the legislatures
have been also protected, but only in the usual way of affording their
members absolute privilege.171 If the framers wanted to afford the legis-
latures further immunity from judicial inquiry, they would have said so
-la-Sri Lanka.
It is true that, on the other hand, the Constitutions do expressly
confer jurisdiction in certain matters whence one might suggest that
where jurisdiction is not so explicitly given, as in the case of judicial
review, none exists. But such jurisdiction has been conferred only in
cases where, were that not done, a plausible argument might have been
made that the change introduced thereby could not have been intended to
be wrought "sub silentio," there being no necessary connection between
the supermacy of a Constitution and the existence of those jurisdictions
in the Courts.
One such matter has to do with determining matters touching on
membership of Parliament. Prior to the commencement of the Constitu-
tions, this was always a matter, not. for the courts, but for Parliament
itself. 172 There is no necessary connection between the supremacy of a
Constitution and the location of this jurisdiction. That is why the handing
over of jurisdiction in this matter to the Courts has been expressly pro-
vided for,173 giving the Courts, as BOLLERS, C.J., of Guyana put it in
PETRIE v. A.G. (GUYANA), 174 "a new or peculiar jurisdiction . . .
special."'1 75 Two features manifest the specialness of this jurisdiction:
firstly appeals cannot go beyond the Court of Appeal, and secondly, either
where the Attorney General is not a party to such proceedings he may
intervene, appear and be represented therein, or such proceedings shall
not be instituted except with the leave of a judge of the Supreme Court.
176
So too, a written Constitution does not per se raise a presumption
that a Bill of Rights fortified by enforcement provisions will be operative
automatically, thus breaking traumatically with the colonial past. Ac-
cordingly, it was necessary to expressly spell out the new provisions in
the way the Constitutions have done.
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The third area in which jurisdiction has been expressly conferred
is the election of the Head of State in Guyana. Never before independence
in any of these countries was that office an elective one; its holder was
always appointed by Her Majesty, though no doubt in consultation with
the Head of Government, holding office during Her Majesty's pleasure.
In Republican Guyana, 177 the Head of State, the President, is elected
by the National Assembly. 178 If the Court of Appeal of Guyana were not
expressly given jurisdiction to hear and determine questions as to the
validity of election of a President, 179 it is difficult to see how it could
be argued that the jurisdiction exists.
It is only in those areas, in respect of which a presumption of
jurisdiction in the Courts does not arise on account of a written constitu-
tion without more, that jurisdiction has been expressly conferred. But a
presumption of general review of legislation is always raised by the
supremacy of a Constitution, to be rebutted by some provision akin to
that which is contained in the Sri Lanka Constitution. Where a Constitu-
tion is supreme, manifesting its supremacy through various restrictions,
prohibitions, limitations, and qualifications imposed on the legislature,
it no more suffices for Courts to merely ascertain the plain meaning
of words used in an Act, rather, as Urias Forbes put it,
a new requirement is to canvass the intentions of an Act to
determine whether its underlying principles are in conflict with
those enshrined in the constitution.' 0
RESTRICTIONS ON PARLIAMENT NEED NOT MEAN
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Not that this article is suggesting that judicial review is an in-
evitable consequence of the existence of limitations on legislative com-
petence. What is being posited is that limitations do raise a strong pre-
sumption of the existence of Judicial review, not a presumption of "legis-
lative supremacy," contrary to what William W. Crosskey thinks.181
Nor is it being suggested that the presumption is irrebuttable. The
framers of the Sri Lanka Constitution have set out so to do, with what
degree of success is yet to be determined.18 2 Or, the Sri Lanka Con-
stitutional Court device may have been used, but instead of its decisions
being "conclusive for all purposes" it could have been given only an
advisory role. Again, a Council of Revision may have been utilised. One
was suggested in America. As proposed, it would have included the
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judiciary and would have operated on a basis analogous to the Sri Lanka
Constitutional Court so that there would have been revision of Bills,
but not judicial review of legislation 'strictu sensu'. But that was re-
jected.
183
So, no institution, other than the ordinary courts of law, was set
up in these countries, Sri Lanka apart, to pass on the validity of Bills
or of Acts. In theory, no institution need be set up, it being the province
of each individual to pass his own judgment on the validity of Acts of
Parliament, giving and withholding obedience accordingly. But in modern
systems this approach is "almost a status of anarchy"' 8 4 so it will require
the clearest showing that the framers opted for it, evidence of which is
certainly lacking.
And if the U.K. system tries to render unconstitutional legislation
impossible rather than inoperative, by relying on public opinion and a
balancing of political powers,18s a system which according to Dicey,
opposes unconstitutional legislation by moral sanctions, 186 it is well to
remember that Dicey suggests that it is the peculiarity of English history
which has produced this, in that England has always, at least since the
Norman Conquest, been governed by an absolute legislator.18 7 On the
other hand, as K.C. Wheare points out:
in many countries a Constitution is thought of as an instrument
by which government can be controlled. Constitutions spring from
a belief in limited government.
88
WERE THE FRAMERS BEING REVOLUTIONARY?
In the legal systems in which these countries operated before the
commencement of these Constitutions, acts of the highest Legislature,
the U.K. Parliament, were not, in classical teaching, amenable to judicial
review, as is still the position in orthodox understanding. 8 9 Now that
the local Legislatures are the highest Legislatures of their respective
systems, that they are subject to judicial review does not necessarily
mean that the framers were men given over to innovations.
Coke's idea that "where an Act of Parliament is against common
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the com-
mon law will control it, and adjudge such act to be void," which he
implemented in DR. BONHAM'S CASESO is not unusually considered
as the 'fons et origo' of the modern concept of judicial review. Edward S.
Corwin, for example, sees that proposition as providing "the most im-
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portant single source of the notion of judicial review." 191 As Raoul Berger
puts it, "the Framers did not pluck the concept of judicial review from
the void. It harked back to Coke's 1610 statement in BONHAM'S
case." 192 Indeed, Edward Coke has been styled "legal father of judicial
review." 19"
So it is difficult to understand how Charles Beard could suggest
that judicial review is the product of "American political genius."
194
Rather, in the Commonwealth, as in the U.S.A., judicial review is, to
quote J. A. C. Grant, "the normal consequence of its political experience
prior to independence," '19 s for colonial constitutions and charters were
treated judicially as binding the colonial legislatures, prevailing over
colonial statutes in the event of conflict. When the colonial constitutions
and charters were replaced by independence Constitutions, the practice
continued, with the word "unconstitutional" replacing the phrase "ultra
vires.9
That is why Dicey could suggest that the originality of the U. S.
draftsmen is perhaps exaggerated in that to one who had inhabited a
colony governed under a Charter whose effect on the validity of a
colonial law was certainly liable to be considered by the Privy Council,
there was "nothing startling" in empowering the judiciary to pronounce
upon the constitutionality of Acts passed by assemblies whose powers
were limited by the constitution, just as the authority of the colonial
legislature was limited by the charter or by an Act of Parliament. In
establishing the Supreme Court, says Dicey, the framers probably had
in mind the functions of the Privy Council.19
6
Accordingly, in asserting the power of judicial review, PHILLIPS,
J. A., in the COLLYMORE case, did not at all believe that he was being
revolutionary. Taking the view that even without express provision a
power of judicial review must reside in the Supreme Court of Trinidad
and Tobago, the learned Justice of Appeal continued thus:
"This conclusion is only in consonance with the view expressed more
than half a century ago by GRIFFITH, C. J., BARTON and O'CONNOR,
JJ., of the High Court of Australia in BAXTER v. COMRS. OF TAXA.
TION (N.S.W.). ((1907), 4 C.L.R. 1087, at p. 1125) that:
English jurisprudence has always recognised that the Acts of a
legislature of limited jurisdiction (whether the limits be as to
territory or subject matter) may be examined by any tribunal before
whom the point is properly raised. The term "unconstitutional", used
in this connection, means no more than ultra vires. 197
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CONCLUSION
It will have been noticed that this article confined itself to the views
of the framers as they manifested themselves in the text of the Constitu-
tions. No attempt was made to consider the views of the framers as they
came out in Convention Halls in debates or in any channel other than the
provisions of the Constitutions themselves. While wanting to remain
outside of the historical approach, 198 one would like to observe that the
first judge to assert the power of judicial review in the independent
Commonwealth Caribbean, WOODING, C. J., of Trinidad and Tobago,
had been representative of the Bar Association of that country to the
Queen's Hall Conference, Trinidad and Tobago, on the draft independ-
ence coiastitution and had played a very active part in the discussions,
especially in relation to the Bill of Rights.1 99
Apt then to describe WOODING, C.J., are the words of Charles
Beard used in relation to MARSHALL, C.J. of the U.S.A.: he had better
opportunities than any student of history or law today to discover the
intention of the framers. So, WOODING, C.J., first Chief Justice of Inde-
pendent Trinidad and Tobago, 200 was no closet philosopher, ignorant of
the conditions under which the Constitution was established and un-
learned in the reason and spirit of that instrument. 20 1
In any case, in the face of the supremacy of these Constitutions
manifested in supreme law clauses; in rigorous requirements for consti-
tutional alterations; in the multiplicity of prohibitions, limitations, re-
strictions, and qualifications on the powers of these legislatures; in Bills
of Rights buttressed with enforcement provisions of wide enough ampli-
tude to embrace contraventions, however arising; in provisions control-
ling the content of legislation, negatively and positively, expressly and
impliedly; given all these demonstrations of the supremacy of these Con-
stitutions over the legislatures, a very strong presumption, surely not of
legislative supremacy, but of judicial review, is raised.
And nothing in the text of the Constitutions attempts to rebut that
presumption in any of these countries. Sri Lanka apart. That is why this
article proposes that the Supreme Courts of these countries have, as
WOODING, C.J., put it in the COLLYMORE CASE.
[the] right and duty to make binding declarations, if and when-
ever warranted, that an enactment passed by Parliament is ultra
vires and therefore void and of no effect [because it contravenes the
Constitution] .202
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'Professor William W. Van Alstyne, "A Critical Guide to MARBURY v. MADI-
SON," (1969), Duke L.J. I, at I.
2 1n Schedules to United Kingdom Independence/Constitution Orders are to be
found some of these Constitutions: Bahamas, Sched., Bahamas Indep. Order, 1973
(S.I. 1973/1080) [UK]; Jamaica, Sched. 2, Jamaica (Const.) Order in Council, 1962,
(S.I. 1962/1550) [UK], as amended by Act. 15 of 1971 (Jamaica); Barbados, Sched.,
Barbados Indep. Order, 1966, (S.I. 1966/1455 [UK], as amended by Act. 34 of 1974
(Barbados); Grenada, Sched. 2, Grenada Const. Order, 1974, (S.I. 1974/-) [UK];
Trinidad and Tobago, Sched. 2, Trinidad and Tobago (Const.) Order in Council,
1962, (S.I. 1962/875) [UK], as amended by Acts 13 of 1964, 22 of 1965, 28 of 1968,
and 15 of 1970 (Trinidad and Tobago); Guyana, Sched. 2, Guyana Indep. Order,
1966, (S.I. 1966/575) [UK], as amended by National Assembly Resolution XXVI of
1969, and Acts 16 of 1968, 1 of 1969, 14 of 1970, 2 of 1971, 7 of 1973 and 19 of
1973 (Guyana).
Such was the nature of the Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka Constitutions until 1971
and 1972, respectively, when they promulgated their own autochthonous Republican
Constitutions thus bringing them to where the U.S. and the India Constitutions al-
ways were. Trinidad and Tobago is on the verge of following suit. See note 18, infra.
3 Apart from the Privy Council where it has jurisdiction, the judicature of these
countries comprises the Supreme Court and a Court of Appeal in the BahamasA
Const., Ch. vii, Parts 1 & 2; Jamaica, Const., Ch. vii, Parts 1 & 2; Barbados, Const.,
Ch. vii; and Sri Lanka, Const., s.122. But it comprises a High Court and a Court of
Appeal in Grenada, Const., Ch. viii, Trinidad and Tobago., Ch. vi, Part 1; Guyana,
Const., Ch. vii, Part 1; and a High Court, a Court of Appeal, and a Supreme Court
in Sierra Leone, Const., Ch. v, so the term "Supreme Court" in relation to these lat-
ter countries means the High Court. The federal judicature of the U.S.A. comprises
one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time
establish, U.S. Const., art. iii, s.1, while the Union judiciary of India comprises a
Supreme Court, India Const., art. 124(i).
4 Bahamas Const., art. 2; Jamaica Const., s.2; Barbados Const., s.1; Grenada
Const., s.106; Guyana Const., art. 2; U.S. Const., art. vi, cl.2; India Const., art. 13(2),
where the principle is stated only in relation to the Bill of Rights, and where, as in
Jamaica, the words "the supreme law" do not appear.
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8See text accompanying notes 3 and 6, supra.
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TION Ch. 1 (10th ed. E.C.S. Wade 1964); 4 Coke, INSTITUTES, at 36; 4 Black-
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1tThe "New View" of U.K. parliamentary sovereignty holds that the U.K. Par-
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legislation. See R.F.V. Heuston, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Ch. 1 (2nd
ed. 1964); Jennings, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL Ch. iv, s.1 (5th ed.
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follows that they are sovereign in the eyes of the "New View." See also BRIBERY
COMR v. RANASINGHE [1965] AC 172, P.C. (Sri Lanka, Ceylon).
I Dicey, supra note 7 at 89. See also, ibid, at 91, 92.
12 0n the view that there cannot be judicial review of the acts of a legislature
which is sovereign in the Diceyan sense, see BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD v
PCKIN [1974] 2 W.L.R. 208, H.L., at 213 C-D per LORD REID, 219 A-C per LORD
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R v JORDAN [1967] Crim. L.Rev. 483, Q.B.D.; H.W.R. Wade, supra note 7, at 187-
188. Dicey, supra note 7, at 91, 102; 0. Hood Phillips, supra note 7, at 25.
13Admittedly, only the India Constitution expressly defines "the State," and only
for purposes of the Bill of Rights, to include "The Government and Parliament of
India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States." India Const.,
art. 12. But, as the Sri Lanka Constitution puts it, the legislature is "the supreme
instrument of State power," s.5, so, any reference to "the State" must include the
legislature unless the contrary is expressly provided or the context otherwise requires.
14 Bahamas Const., art. 52(1); Jamaica Const., s.48(l); Barbados Const., s.48(1);
Grenada Const., s.38; Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.36; Guyana Const., art. 72;
Sierra Leone Const., s.3 3; India Const. art. 245(1); The U.S. Const., art. 1, s.1 pro-
vides that "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, whence it follows that such legislative powers as are not therein
granted expressly or by necessary intendment, shall not vest in Congress. But see Sri
Lanka Const., s.44.
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20The Constitution Commission of Trinidad and Tobago, (this Commission, com-
prising, among others, Sir Hugh Wooding, former Chief Justice of that country, as
Chairman, and T. Georges, formerly a judge of the High Court there and formerly
Chief Justice of Tanzania now Professor of Law, U.W.I., set up by the Governor-
General in 1971 to make recommendations for the revision of the Trinidad and To-
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ing a Republican form of Government in lieu of the Monarchical one which now
obtains there, in its paper THINKING THINGS THROUGH 38 (Government Print-
ery, Trinidad and Tobago, 1972), speaking of the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament
said this: [B]ecause the Constitution binds everybody, including the Parliament set
up under its provisions, Parliament's right to pass laws is subject to such restrictions
as the Constitution imposes."
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21Bahamas Const., art. 54(1); Jamaica Const., s.49(1); Barbados Const., s.49(l);
Grenada Const., s.39 (l); Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.38 (1); Guyana Const., art.
73(1); U.S. Const., art. v.; Sierra Leone Const., s.3
4 (l); Sri Lanka Const., s.44 ;
India Const., art. 368(1).
2 2Bahamas Const., art. 54(2)-(3); Jamaica Const., s.49(2)-(6); Barbados Const.,
s.49(2)-( 4 ); Grenada Const., s.39(2)-(5); Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.38(2)-(3);
Guyana Const., art. 73(2), (3), (5); U.S. Const., art. v; Sierra Leone Const., s.34(J)
proviso, (3); Sri Lanka Const., s.51(5); India Const., art. (368(2).
Only in the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago can alterations be made by
simple majority vote of Parliament. In Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Sri
Lanka all the provisions may be altered by Parliament alone. In the Bahamas,
Jamaica, Grenada, and Guyana some alterations cannot be made without the approval
of the electors voting in referenda, with required majorities varying from a simple
majority in the Bahamas and Guyana through a three-fifths majority in Jamaica for
certain purposes to a two-thirds majority in Jamaica for other purposes and in Gren-
ada. Some alterations in India, and all in the U.S.A., require ratification by not less
than one-half of the states' Legislatures in India and by the Legislatures of three-
fourths of the American states or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof. Sierra
Leone is the country which has to have a dissolution for certain purposes.
2 3Dicey, supra Note 7, 88. See also, ibid, at 91, 92. For the inability of these
Legislatures to meet another of Dicey's requirements, see text accompanying notes
7-10, supra.
24J.D.B. Mitchell, supra note 8, at 87, and "Sovereignty of Parliament - Yet
Again", 79 L.Q. Rev. 196, at 219 (1963)
25Dicey supra note 7, at 90-91. See also, ibid, at 92. and see, further, note 10,
supra.
26 Bahamas Const., arts. 16-27; Jamaica Const., ss.14-2 4, Barbados Const., ss.12-23;
Grenada Const., ss.2-15; Trinidad and Tobago Const., ss.1-5; Guyana Const., arts.
4-17; U.S. Const., Amends. I-X; Sierra Leone Const., ss.2-13, Sir Lanka Const.,
s.18(1); India Const., arts. 14-31C.
27 Bahamas Const., art. 20(1); Jamaica Const., s.20(1); Barbados Const., s.18(1);
Grenada Const., s.8(8); Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.2(e) (h); Guyana Const., art.
art. 10(1); Sierra Leone Const., s.9(1)
28Bahamas Const., art. 20(8); Jamaica Const., s.20(2); Barbados Const., s.18(8);
Grenada Const., s.8(8); Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.2(e)(h); Guyana Const., art.
10(8); Sierra Leon Const., s.9(2)
29 Sri Lanka Const., s.18(1(a); India Const., art. 14, (and see U.S. Const.,
Amend. xiv, s.1, which applies to the member states of the United States).
30U.S. Const., Amend v, (see also, ibid., Amend. xiv, s.1), Trinidad and Tobago
Const., s.l(a).
31Bahamas Const., art. 27(1)(c); Jamaica Const., s.18(1); Barbados Const.,
s.16(1); Grenada Const., s.6(1),(2); Guyana Const., art. 8(1); Sierra Leone
Const., s.7(1)(c); U.S. Const., Amend. v. But see India Const., art. 31(2); there is
no such provision in Sri Lanka Constitution.
On decisions on provisions in "pari materia" with these see D'AGUIAR v.
A.G. (BRITISH GUIANA). (1961-62) 4 WIR 481, S.C. [BRITISH GUIANA now
GUYANA] (1964-65) 7 WIR 496, British Car. Court of Appeal.
32Bahamas Const., art. 26(1); Jamaica Const., s.24(1); Barbados Const., s.23(1);
Grenada Const., s.13(1); Guyana Const., art. 15(1); Sierra Leone Const., s.13(l);
cf. Sri Lanka Const., s.18(1)(h)
See AKAR v A.G. (SIERRA LEONE) [1970] AC 853, P.C. (SIERRA LEONE)
and R. v. DRYBONES (1970) 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473. The Jamaican case BYFIELD v
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ALLEN (1972) 16 WIR 1, C.A. [JAMAICA], and the Antiguan case CAMACHO
and SONS, LTD v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS (1971 18 WIR 159, C.A. [WEST
INDIES ASSOCIATED STATES], also deal with these provisions but as far as
administrative action is concerned.
3 3Sir Lanka Const., s.18(1)(a); India Const., art. 14; (and see U.S. Const.,
Amend xiv, s.1).
34U.S. Const,, Amend. 1. See William Brennan, "The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment", 79 Harv. R.Rev.1 (1965-66).
Contra BATES v. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK 361 U.S. 516 (1960) BLACK AND
DOUGLAS, J.J., Concurring).
35Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.2(b), (e)(h), respectively.
36 Acts and Subsidiary Legislation of Trinidad and Tobago, 1965, Act. No. 8,
after having been amended by the Industrial Stabilisation (Amendment) Act 1965,
Act. No. 5 of 1967, and the Industrial Stabilisation (Amendment) (No. 2) Act,
1967 Act No. 11 of 1967, the Act has now been repealed and replaced by the
Industrial Relations Act, 1972, Act No. 23 of 1972.
37 The provisions of thc Act abridging strike action were said to violate freedom
of association and assembly guaranteed by s.l(j) of the Constitution. It was also
urged that the provisions of the Act enabling the Attorney General to authorize a
public officer to enter the business premises of a trade union to require the pro-
duction of literature contravened the right to privacy and the right to property
guaranteed by s.l(c) of the Constitution. Again, the Industrial Court, established
by the Act, was given discretion to disclose information demanded from any source
or to prohibit its publication, which was said to violate the right to a fair hearing
and procedural fairness guaranteed by s.2(e),(h) of the Constitution. Finally, the
Act provided for the cancellation of a trade union's registration for the commission
of certain offences, thus disabling it from operating, which the appellants claimed
to be a cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, contrary to s.2(b) of the
Constitution. All these grounds of challenge failed to impress the Trinidad and
Tobago Court of Appeal and the Privy Council.
38But see Charles Beard, "The Supreme Court - Usurper or Grantee" in
ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (Robert G. McCloskey ed. 1957) in which
place, with reference to a situation similar to this one, in the American case
HYLTON v. U.S, 3 Dallas 171 (1796), he asks rhetorically, "If the court believed
that it did not have the power to declare the act void as well as the power to
sustain it, why did it assume jurisdiction at all or take the trouble to consider and
render an opinion on the constitutionality of the tax?"
39Cf. Charles Beard, ibid., at 55 n.72 dealing with the assertion of judicial
review in MARYBURY v. MADISON.
40The Canadian Bill of Rights is Part 1 of the Act for the Recognition and
Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, 1960, Statutes of Canada, 1960 (8-9
Elizabeth II, Vol. 1, C.44) S.2 thereof states that "Every law of Canada shall, unless
it is expressly declared by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate
notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as not to
abrogate, abridge or infringe or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringe-
ment of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and declared." For the
Trinidadian S.2 see text accompanying note 33, supra. The Chief Justice took the
view that the Canadian S.2 is only a rule of construction; (1968) 12 WIR 5, at
8H-I. Maybe the decision and reasoning of the Canadian Supreme Court in R. v.
DRYBONES (1970) 9 DLR (3d) 473 requires qualification of WOODING, C.J.'s
understanding of the Canadian Bill of Rights. But see S.A. deSmith, THE NEW
COMMONWEALTH AND ITS CONSTITUTIONS, at 209. See also note 40 infra.
41(1968) 12 WIR 5, at 9A-8.
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4 2Phillips, J.A. (1968) 12 WIR 5 at 21 G-I, citing Bora Laskin, "Canada's Bill of
Rights: A Dilemma for the Courts?" 11 Int'l. & Comp. L.Q. 530 (1962) and S.A.
deSmith, "Fundamental Rights in the New Commonwealth", 10 Int'l. & Comp. L.Q.
215 at 228-32 (1961) was quite aware of the conflict of legal opinion as to the true
interpretation of the Canadian provision, hut he saw no need to try to resolve that
conflict. See also D.B. Fowler, "The Canadian Bill of Rights - A Compromise
Between Parliamentary & Judicial Supremacy, 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 721 (1973).
43(1968) 12 WIR 5, at 21 1 22B.
44(1968) 12 WIR 5, at 35C.
4 5Bahamas Const., art. 16(1); Jamaica Const., s.14(l); Barbados Const., s.12(1);
Grenada Const., S.2(1); Guyana Const., art. 4(1); Sierra Leone Const., s.2(1). But
see Sri Lanka, s.18(1) (b); India Const., art. 21.
46 Bahamas Const., art. 17(1); Jamaica Const., s.17(l); Barbados Const., s.15(1);
Grenada Const., s.5(1); Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.2(b); Guyana Const., art.
7(1); U.S. Const., Amend. VIII; Sierra Leone Const., s.6(1). The Sri Lanka and
India Constitutions do not have such a provision.
4 7Bahamas Const., art. 21(1); Jamaica Const., s.19(1); Barbados Const., s.17(1);
Grenada Const., s.7(1); Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.1(c); Guyana Const., art.
9(1); U.S. Const., Amend. IV; Sierra Leone Const., s.8(1). The Sri Lanka and India
Constitutions do not have such a provision.
48Bahamas Const., arts. 22(1), 23(1), 24(1) respectively; Jamaica Const.,
ss.21(1), 22(1), 23(1) respectively; Barbados Const., ss.19(1), 20(1), 21(1) respec-
tively; Grenada Const., ss.9 (l), 10(1), 11(1) respectively; U.S. Consti., Amend.
1; Sierra Leone Const., ss.10(1), 11(1), 12(1) respectively; Sri Lanka Const.,
ss.18(1),(d),(g),(f) respectively: India Const., arts. 19(1)(a), (b)-(c), 25(1) respec-
tively. Cf. JAUNDOO v. A.G. (GUYANA) (1968) 12 WIR 221, at 226F-I, per
STOBY, C.
49See H.W.R. Wade, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW Ch.5 (3rd ed. 1971); S.A.
deSmitli, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (Chs. 4-5) (3rd
ed. 1973); Chucks Okpaluba, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
IN GUYANA 18-36 (1972; K.C. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT Chs. 7, 12
(3rd ed. 1972).
50See notes 25, 27, supra; and note 53, in/ra.
5IBahamas Const., art. 20(2); Jamaica Const., s.20(6); Barbados Const., s.18(2);
Grenada Const., s.8(2); Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.2(f),(c), (i)(ii), (h); Guy-
ana Const., art. 10(2); Sierra Leone Const., s.9(5). Cf India Const., art. 22(1), (2)
Sri Lanka Constitution has no such provision. On the U.S., see note 53, infra.
52See notes 26-28 supra., note 53, in/ra.
53332 U.S. 46, 91 L. ed. 1903 (1946).
54332 U.S. 46 at 67-68, 91 L. ed. 1903, at 1917 (1946).
5 5See note 28, supra.
56 0n some of the different understandings of the requirements of "due process
of law", see the following American cases: PALKO v. CONNECTICUT, 302, U.S.
319, 82 L. ed. 288 (1937), ADAMSON v. CALIFORNIA, 322 U.S. 46, 91 L. ed.
(1946): WOLF v. COLORADO, 338 U.S. 25, 93 L. ed. 1782 (1948); ROCHIN v.
CALIFORNIA, 342 U.S. 165, 96 L. ed. (1951); IRVINE v. CALIFORNIA, 347
U.S. 128. 98 L. ed. 561 (1953); MAPP v. OHIO, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081
(1960); BETTS v. BRADY, 316 U.S. 455, 86 L. ed. (1593); GIDEON v. WAIN-
WRIGHT, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. ed. 2d 799 (1963). So too, the rules of Natural
Justice are not fixed; see readings note 47, supra.
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57Albert van de Sand Centlines, "Constitution and Law in South Africa", in
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW 444 (A.E. Sutherland ed. 1956) dealing with the
U.K. and South Africa, notes that "the right to be heard before you are deprived
of your life, liberty, or property is a fundamental constitutional convention but...
there is nothing to prevent Parliament from infringing that convention."
5 8See text accompanying note 41, supra.
S9Maybe they could not understand how the Privy Council could refer to the
then Ceylon Parliament as sovereign and yet strike down its legislation in BRIBERY
COMR. v. BRANASINGHE, and LIYANAGE v. THE QUEEN [1965] AC 259 for
being inconsistent with the then Ceylon Constitution when orthodox U.K. constitu-
tionalists hold that the Acts of a sovereign legislature cannot be questioned in a
court of law on any ground whatever, see note 10, supra.
60Sri Lanka Const., s.48(2).
61Sri Lanka Const., s.54(l)-(3).
62Sri Lanka Const., s.54(4). Query: can ANISMINIC v. FOREIGN COMPEN-
SATION COMMISSION [1969] 2AC 147, H.L. apply here?
6 3Bahamas Const., art. 28(1), (2)(a); Jamaica Const., s.25(l), (2); Barbados
Const., s.24(), (2)(a); Grenada Const., s.16(1), (2)(a); Trinidad and Tobago
Const., s.6(1), (2)(a); Guyana Const., art. 19(1), (2)(a); Sierra Leone Const.,
s.14(l), (2)(a). And see the Sri Lanka Const., s.54(2)(e) which allows citizens
to move the Constitutional court to have it declare a Bill unconstitutional. On the
Indian provisions see text accompanying note 65, infra. The American Constitution
does not have such a provision.
64(1968) 12 WIR 5, at 22C.
65 Bahamas Const., art. 104; Barbados Const., s.87; Guyana Const., art. 92(1)
(b); on Guyana, see the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Termination of
Appeals) Acts, 1970, Act. No. 14 [Guyana], and the Constitution (Amendment)
Act, 1973, Act No. 19 [Guyana].
66
1n Grenada, appeal is "as of right" in respect of all human rights but only
to the Court of Appeal, but in the case of property rights it goes all the way up
the Privy Council "as of right": Grenada Const., s.103(b), 104(1)(a). So too appeal
from determination of the Supreme Court on property rights is "as of right" from
the Court of Appeal to the Privy Council in the Bahamas, Const., art. 104; Jamaica,
Const., s.110(1)(a); Barbados Const., s.87; Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.82(1)(a);
with the remarkable result that appeals are "as of right" in Jamaica and Trinidad
and Tobago in respect of property rights from the Court of Appeal to the Privy
Council without those words appearing in the section providing for appeal to the
Court of Appeal from the Supreme Court: Jamaica Const., ss.3.110(1)(a), 25(3)
respectively, Trinidad and Tobago Const., ss.82(1)(a), 6(4) respectively. Those
words never appear in these provisions in Sierra Leone: Const., s.14(4).
6 7India Const., art. 32(1) (2). See also, ibid., art. 226.
68(1952) 39 All India Rptr. 196, S.C.
69(1952) 39 All India Rptr. 196, at 199. There the Criminal Law Amendment
(Madras) Art. 1950 was held to violate art. 19 of the Indian Constitution and so void.
70(1954) 41 All India Rptr. 119, S.C. There the Indian Supreme Court struck
down the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance,
1950, Ordinance No. 2 of 1950, and Act, No. 28 of 1950, for offending art. 31(2)
of the Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of property.
. 71(1954) 41 All India Rptr. 119 at 138. See also BOYD v .U.S. 116 U.S. 616,
at 635, 29 L. ed. 29 L. ed. 746, at 752, per BRADLEY, J. (1885) STATE OF WEST
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BENGAL v. SUBODH GOPAL (1954) 41 All India Rptr. 92, S.C. at 118, per
JAGANNADHADAS, I.; JAMES v. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA [19361
AC 578, P.C., at 613-614, per LORD WRIGHT, M.R. The rule extends even to
ordinary legislation: COLONIAL SUGAR REFINING CO. LTD. v. MELBOURNE
HARBOUR TRUST COMRS. [1927] AC 343, P.C., at 359, per LORD WARRING-
TON. But see text accompanying notes 141, 144; inlra.
72 The Courts tend to say that they will not give constitutional redress where the
Bills of Rights are infringed by the action of a private individual: BURDEAU v.
McDOWELL, 256 U.S. 465, 65 L. ed. 1048 (1920); McGUIRE v. U.S. 273 U.S. 95
at 99, 71 L. ed. 556, at 557 (1927); IRVINE v. CALIFORNIA, 347 U.S. 128, 98
L. ed. 561 (1953) BANTON v. ALCOA MINERALS OF JAMAICA (1973) 17 WIR
275 S.C. [JAMAICA], at 290A, per GRAHAM PERKINS, J. But see FELDMAN v.
U.S., 322 487, 88 L. ed. 1408 (1944); LUSTWIG v. U.S., 338 U.S. 74, 93 L. ed.
1819 (1949).
7 3See text accompanying note 83, infra.
74 For the other set of provisions see text accompanying note 33, supra.
75(1968) 12 WIR 5, at BE.
7 6See text accompanying note 62, supra.
7 7For s.2 see text accompanying note 33, supra. s. 6 is the section now being
dealt with, see text accompanying note 61, supra.
78(1968) 12 WIR 5, at 35 B-D.
79(1968) 12 WIR 221, C.A. [GUYANA]; (1972) AC 972, P.C.
80There private land was acquired by the state without the Government's paying
compensation therefor, thus contravening, it was alleged, the constitutional right
to property. But the question before the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council was
whether originating motion for an injunction against the Crown restraining the
building of the road till adequate compensation was paid was a procedure sanc-
tioned by the constitution. The trial judge thought that it was not, the appeal to
the Court of Appeal failed although two of three members of the Court thought it
was, as did the Privy Council. So, no question of judicial review of legislation
arose.
8t See text accompanying note 37, supra.
82(1968) 12 WIR 221, at 226 H, 235 G.
83Art. 19 is the one being now dealt with, see text accompanying note 61, supra.
84(1968) 12 WIR 221, at 239 E-F.
85(1968) 12 WIR 221, at 243 I.
86(1968) 12 WIR 221, at 245 A.
87(1968) 12 WIR 221, at 254 F-G.
88(1968) 12 WIR 221 at 254 H.
89(1968) 12 WIR 221 at 261 D.
90"Associated State" is a status created by the West Indies Act, 1967, (15 and
16 Elizabeth 2, C.4) [U.K.], s.1(3) in respect of the territories named in s.1(2),
which are Antigua, Dominica, Grenada (now independent), St. Christopher, Nevis
and Anguilla, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent. By s.3 of the Act, these states are fully
competent in internal affairs, while the United Kingdom Parliament retains equally
full sovereignty in external affairs and defence, nationality or citizenship, succession
to the Throne or the Royal Style and Titles.
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9 t Just as in the case of most of the independent states, so too with the Associ-
ated States, in Schedules to United Kindom Constitution Orders, see n.1, supra,
are to be found these Constitutions: Antigua, Schedule 2 to the Antigua Const.,
Order, 1967, S.I. 1967/225 [U.K.]: St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla, Schedule 2
to the St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguila Const. Order, 1967, S.I. 1967/228 [U.K.];
Dominica, Schedule 2 to the Dominica Const. Order, 1967, S.I. 1967/226 [U.K.]; St.
Lucia, Schedule 2 to the St. Lucia Const. Order, 1967, S.I. 1967/229 [U.K.]; St.
Vincent, Schedule 2 to the St. Vincent Const. Order 1969, S.I. 1969/1500 [U.K.].
92 Antigua Const., s.37; St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla Const., s.34; Do-
minica Const., s.33 ; St. Lucia Const., s.35; St. Vincent Const., s.36. Cf. note 12,
supra.
93Antigua Const., s.38( 2 ); (4); St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla Const.,
s.35(2)-(4); Dominica Const., s.34(2), (3); St. Lucia Const., s.36(2), (3); St.
Vincent Const., s.37(2), (3). Cf. note 20, supra.
94 Antigua Const., ss.2-14; St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla Const., ss.2-15 ;
Dominica Const., ss.2-15; St. Lucia Const., ss.2-15; St. Vincent Const., ss.2-15.
Cf. note 24, supra.
95Antigua Const., s.15(1), (2); St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla Const.,
s.16(l), (2)(a); Dominica Const., s.16(1), (2)(a); St. Lucia Const., s.16(), (2)(a);
St. Vincent Const., s.16(1), (2) (a); Cf. note 61, supra.
9 6"The West Indies Associated States: Some Aspects of the Constitutional
Arrangements", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, 57 at 82 (Institute of
Social and Econ. Research, U.W.I., Jamaica, March, 1970).
9 7See note 83, supra and accompanying text.
98Grenada and the Associated States share judicial services. There is a Supreme
Court and a Court of Appeal of Grenada and the Associated States; see Grenada
Const., s.105.
99The existence of the power of judicial review of legislation had been taken
for granted and exercised to strike down the Public Meetings and Processions
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1967, as being inconsistent with the rights guaranteed
by ss.10 and II of the Constitution of that state to freedom of expression, and of
association and assembly respectively, in CHIEF OF POLICE v. POWELL AND
THOMAS (1968) 12 WIR 403, High Court. See also CHARLES v. PHILLIPS AND
SEALEY (1966-67) 10 WIR 423, C.A. [WIAS]; and HERBERT v. PHILLIPS AND
SEALEY (1966-67) 10 WIR 435, C.A. [WIAS] where the Court of Appeal of the
Associated States struck down an Imperial Order in Council, the Leeward Islands
(Emergency Provisions) Order in Council 1959, as being unconstitutional. A chal-
lenge failed on the facts in FRANCIS v. CHIEF OF POLICE (1970), 15 WIR I,
C.A.
10OBahamas Const., art. 17(2) ; Jamaica Const., s.17(2) ; Barbados Const., s.15(2);
Grenada Const., s.5(2); Guyana Const., art. 7(2); Sierra Leone Const., s.6(2); Cf.
India Const., art. 13(1). The Trinidad and Tobago, U.S., and Sri Lanka Constitu-
tions do not have such a provision.
10t Bahamas Const., arts. 19(1), 20(1), 30; Jamaica Const., ss.5(1), 20(5),
26(8); Barbados Const., ss.13(1), 18(1), 26; Grenada Const., ss.3(1), 8(11), Sched.
3 to the Grenada Constitution Order, s.1; Guyana Const., art. 5(1), 10(11), 18;
Sierra Leone Const., ss.3(1), 9(4) proviso, 9(5) proviso, 9(8) proviso; India Const.,
arts. 15(3)-(4), 16(3)-(5). Only one of these provisos appears in Trinidad and
Tobago, s.3, and Sri Lanka, s.18(3). The U.S. Constitution has none such.
102Bahamas Const., art. 21(2); Jamaica Const., s.19(2); Barbados Const.,
s.17(2); Grenada Const., s.7(2); Guyana Const., art. 9(2); Sierra Leone Const.,
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s.8(2). In the U.S. the search must not be "unreasonable" U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
The Trinidad and Tobago and Sri Lanka Constitutions do not have such a pro-
vision.
103 Bahamas Const., arts. 22(5), 23(2), 24(2), 25(2) respectively; Jamaica
Const., ss.21(6), 22(2), 23(2), 17(3) respectively; Barbados Const., ss.19(6), 20(a),
21(2), 22(3) respectively; Grenada Const., ss.9(5), 10(2), 11(2), 12(3) respectively;
Guyana Const., arts. 11(6), 12(2), 13(2), 14(3) respectively; Sierra Leone Const.,
ss.10(5), 11(2), 12(2), 4(3) respectively. Cf. India Const., arts. 25(1), 19(2), 19(3)-
(4), 19(5) respectively; Sri Lanka Const., s.18(2). The Trinidad and Tobago, and
U.S. Constitutions do not so provide.
104Bahamas Const., art. 26(5), (9); Jamaica Const., s.24(5)-(7); Barbados
Const., s.23(4)(6); Grenada Const., s.13(5), (7); Guyana Const., art. 15(4), (6);
Sierra Leone Const., s.13(7); Sri Lanka Const., s.18( 2 ); Cf. India Const., art.
15(3)-(4). The Trinidad and Tobago and U.S. Constitutions do not have such a
proviso.
105Bahamas Const., art. 27(1)(a)-(b), (2)-(4); Jamaica Const., s.18(2)-(4);
Barbados Const., s.1 6 (2 )-( 4 ); Grenada Const., s.6(5)-(7); Guyana Const., art. 8(2)-
(4); Sierra Leone Const., s.7(1)(a)-(b), (2)-(3). Cf. India Const., art. 31(5)(b)
(ii). Not so in the Trinidad and Tobago, and U.S. Constitutions.
106Bahamas Const., art. 137(1); Jamaica Const., s.1(1); Barbados Const.,
s.117(1); Grenada Const., s.111(1); Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.105(1); Guyana
Const., art. 125(1); Sierra Leone Const., s.93(1).
107Trinidad and Tobago Const., ss.3, 4, 5 respectively. Compare Special Acts in
Jamaica, Const., s.50.
108See note 18, supra.
109THINKING THINGS THROUGH, at 6.
11OSee notes 3-10 and accompanying text, supra.
1 11See notes 11-18 and accompanying text, supra.
"12 See notes 19-23 and accompanying text, supra.
113See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15.
114Bahamas Const., art. 13(b); Jamaica Const., s.11 (b); Barbados Const., s.9(b);
Grenada Const., s.99(2); Trinidad and Tobago Const., s.17(b); Guyana Const., art.
28(b). Cf. Sri Lanka Const., s.67 proviso. But see India Const. art. 11. Depriving one
of one's citizenship is not a power given by the U.S. Constitution to Congress.
Sierra Leone has no Citizenship Laws in its Constitution although those laws are
entrenched in the Constitution, s.34(3), and see AKAR v. A.G. (SIERRA LEONE)
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